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Highly neurotic never-depressed students have
negative biases in information processing
STELLA W. Y. CHAN 1, GUY M. GOODWIN 2 AND CATHERINE J. HARMER 1*
1 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK ; 2 Department of Psychiatry,
University of Oxford, UK
ABSTRACT
Background. Cognitive theories associate depression with negative biases in information proces-
sing. Although negatively biased cognitions are well documented in depressed patients and to some
extent in recovered patients, it remains unclear whether these abnormalities are present before the
ﬁrst depressive episode.
Method. High neuroticism (N) is a well-recognized risk factor for depression. The current study
therefore compared diﬀerent aspects of emotional processing in 33 high-N never-depressed and
32 low-N matched volunteers. Awakening salivary cortisol, which is often elevated in severely
depressed patients, was measured to explore the neurobiological substrate of neuroticism.
Results. High-N volunteers showed increased processing of negative and/or decreased processing
of positive information in emotional categorization and memory, facial expression recognition
and emotion-potentiated startle (EPS), in the absence of global memory or executive deﬁcits. By
contrast, there was no evidence for eﬀects of neuroticism on attentional bias (as measured with the
dot-probe task), over-general autobiographical memory, or awakening cortisol levels.
Conclusions. These results suggest that certain negative processing biases precede depression rather
than arising as a result of depressive experience per se and as such could in part mediate the
vulnerability of high-N subjects to depression. Longitudinal studies are required to conﬁrm that
such cognitive vulnerabilities predict subsequent depression in individual subjects.
INTRODUCTION
The aetiology of depression in community
samples has been intensively investigated in
twin studies that can broadly distinguish genetic
from environmental factors. The existing litera-
ture suggests that the key vulnerability factors
are neuroticism, family history of depression
and early abuse/neglect or trauma, whereas the
precipitating factor is often an adverse life
event. Working with these variables, depressive
episodes are moderately well predicted at the
12-month follow-up (Kendler et al. 1993, 2002,
2004, 2006).
While these ﬁndings are robust, the approach
is essentially observational and thus insuﬃcient
to indicate the mechanisms whereby clinical
depression emerges in high-risk individuals. The
present study therefore set out to determine the
cognitive and neurophysiological mechanisms
of neuroticism, whereby adversity may lead to
depression.
Cognitive theories of depression emphasize
the role of negative biases in information pro-
cessing in the aetiology and maintenance of the
disorder (Beck et al. 1979). Biases on the inter-
pretation and memory for emotional infor-
mation have been reported. For example, in
facial expression recognition tasks, depressed
patients show reduced recognition of positive
expressions and/or increased perception of
negative expressions (Gur et al. 1992; Bouhuys
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et al. 1999; Surguladze et al. 2004), that is a bias
away from positive towards negative. Negative
perceptual and memory biases have also been
found in healthy volunteers following negative
mood induction (Teasdale & Russell, 1983;
Bouhuys et al. 1995). Although attentional
biases are less consistently found in depression,
dot-probe tasks have revealed increased atten-
tion to negative stimuli in dysphoric patients
and healthy volunteers undergoing a negative
mood induction when longer stimulus durations
are used (Bradley et al. 1997).
Although the state of severe depression is
evidently associated with cognitive abnormali-
ties, there are fewer comparable studies con-
ducted in recovered patients. In general, global
impairments of executive function resolve
following recovery (Peselow et al. 1991; Austin
et al. 2001), but certain residual emotional bia-
ses remain and may provide the mediating
mechanisms in subsequent relapse. Thus, facial
expression recognition was found to be nega-
tively biased in recovered depressed patients
(Bouhuys et al. 1999; Bhagwagar et al. 2004;
Hayward et al. 2005) and this was associated
with subsequent relapse (Bouhuys et al. 1999).
In parallel with the cognitive ﬁndings are
reports of dysfunction of the hypothalamic–
pituitary–adrenal (HPA) system in depression.
HPA dysfunction can be indicated by an elev-
ated cortisol response to awakening, as demon-
strated in both acutely depressed (Pruessner
et al. 1997) and recovered patients (Bhagwagar
et al. 2003). Longitudinal studies have provided
evidence that cortisol level predicts subsequent
depression onset in adult women (Harris et al.
2000) and adolescents (Goodyer et al. 2000).
Elevated cortisol levels may also contribute to
the learning and memory impairments reported
in depression (Young et al. 1999).
Thus, measurable cognitive and HPA abnor-
mality may be present in recovery from de-
pression, but we cannot rule out a scar eﬀect, so
called because the residual biases and elevated
cortisol may be a consequence of depression,
rather than implying occurrence before the
onset of the ﬁrst episode. The present study
therefore recruited young euthymic college
students with high versus low scores for neuro-
ticism (N), and without a history of depression.
We hypothesized that high-N volunteers would
display aﬀective processing biases favouring
negative versus positive information. These
biases might also be accompanied by elevated
morning cortisol levels, but global impairments
of executive function were unlikely before a
depressive episode.
METHOD
Volunteers and design
The study was approved by the local ethics
committee. Seventy-two healthy college stu-
dents with high or low N scores (see below)
gave written informed consent to the study,
and received payment for their participation.
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
was used to screen for axis I disorders and seven
volunteers were excluded from the study be-
cause of current or previous depression or
anxiety disorders.
N scores for screening were derived from
the 12-item neuroticism scale of the shortened
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ;
Eysenck et al. 1985). Thirty-three (22 women)
were in the high-N group (H: mean score=9.58,
range=8–12) and 32 (18 women) in low-N
group (L: mean score=1.25, range=0–3). The
two groups were matched for age (18.82¡0.98
v. 19.06¡0.88), gender, verbal IQ (40.12¡2.80
v. 38.16¡5.54) and spatial IQ (26.19¡11.37 v.
22.43¡9.37) assessed with the National Adult
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) and the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised
(WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981).
Characterization of state and trait variables
To assess mood, personality, family background
and life experience, participants were inter-
viewed with the Hamilton Depression Rating
Scale (HAMD; Hamilton, 1967) and ﬁlled in
the following questionnaires : the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.
1970), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck
et al. 1961), Beﬁndlichkeits Scale of Mood and
Energy (Bf-S; von Zerssen et al. 1974), Fear of
Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson &
Friend, 1969), Buss–Durkee Hostility Inventory
(Buss & Durkee, 1957), Social Adaptation
Self-Evaluation Scale (SASS; Bosc et al.
1997), Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS;
Weissmann, 1979, factors taken from Cane et al.
1986), ruminative items of the Response Styles
Questionnaire (modiﬁed by Treynor et al. 2003),
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EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), Parental
Bonding Inventory (PBI; Parker et al. 1979),
stressful life events (adopted fromGoodyer et al.
1997), and family history of psychiatric dis-
orders. Two participants did not complete all
the questionnaires.
Emotional categorization
Main task : personality characteristics
categorization
Sixty personality characteristics chosen to be
extremely desirable (e.g. honest) or undesirable
(e.g. rude) (Anderson, 1968, matched on word
length, frequency and meaningfulness) were
presented on a computer screen for 500 ms.
Participants were asked to categorize these traits
as likeable or dislikeable by pressing the labelled
key on the keyboard. To encourage self-referent
judgement, participants were asked to imagine
whether they would be pleased or displeased
if they overheard someone describing them in
this way.
Control task : animal attributes categorization
A similar task was carried out as a control, using
60 attribute words (30 per valence). This time
participants were asked to classify each attribute
as an ‘advantage’ (e.g. strong) or ‘disadvan-
tage’ (e.g. weak) for a predatory animal. In both
tasks classiﬁcations and reaction times for the
correct identiﬁcations were recorded.
Emotional memory
A surprise memory task comprising recall and
recognition (60 target words plus 60 distracters)
was conducted 15 min after completing each
of the categorization tasks. The number of
correctly and incorrectly recalled words was
counted. Recognition data were analysed using
signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966;
Grier, 1971) to derive a measure of accuracy
corrected for subjects’ response tendency. The
proportion of correctly recognized words (y)
and the proportion of falsely recognized words
(x) were entered into the following equations to
give the sensitivity measure dk and the response
bias b : dk=0.5+[(yxx)(1+yxx)/4y(1xx)] ;
b=[y(1xy)xx(1xx)]/[y(1xy)+x(1xx)]. This
allowed an assessment of accuracy (hits) un-
confounded by the response criterion used by
the volunteer.
Facial expression recognition
Stimuli and procedure
Pictures of faces representing six basic emotions
(happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, anger, and
disgust) were taken from the Pictures of Aﬀect
Series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). These were
morphed between each full emotion (100%) and
neutral (0%) in 10% steps (Young et al. 1997) :
four examples were given per intensity per
emotion. Each face was also presented in a
neutral expression, giving a total of 250 stimuli.
Each stimulus ﬂashed up on a computer screen
for 500 ms followed by a blank screen. Partici-
pants were asked to recognize the emotion
by pressing the appropriate key. Accuracy and
reaction times for correct choices and mis-
classiﬁcations were recorded. Accuracy was
deﬁned by the threshold, that is the intensity
level at which the participant gave three or
more (i.e.o75%) correct responses across three
consecutive intensity levels.
Dot-probe task
Stimuli and procedure
The emotional stimuli included 60 social
threatening negative words and 60 positive
words, each of which was paired with a matched
neutral word. Another 60 neutral–neutral word
pairs were given as ﬁllers. Preceded by a ﬁxation
cross (500 ms), a word pair was presented on the
screen with one word above another. In the un-
masked condition the word pair was presented
for 500 ms, whereas in the masked condition the
word pair appeared for 14 ms followed by the
display (186 ms) of a mask. After that, a probe
(one or two stars) appeared in the position of
either preceding word, and participants were
asked to indicate the number of stars. These 360
trials were presented in three blocks in random
order. Reaction time and accuracy were re-
corded. Attentional vigilance scores were calcu-
lated for each participant by subtracting the
mean score of ‘congruent trials ’ (where the probe
and emotional words appeared in the same
position) from that of the ‘ incongruent trials ’
(where they appeared in opposite positions).
Emotion-potentiated startle (EPS)
Stimuli
Sixty-three pictures of three categories (pleas-
ant, unpleasant, neutral) were taken from the
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International Aﬀective Picture System (gender-
speciﬁed, Larson et al. 2000). Each picture was
presented for 13 s (mean inter-trial interval=
13 s) on a computer screen. The pictures were
presented in three blocks in a ﬁxed order so
that no two of the same category would appear
successively.
Procedure and recording
The eye-blink component of the startle response
was recorded from the orbicularis oculi using
electromyography (EMG startle response sys-
tem, San Diego Instruments, Inc., San Diego,
CA, USA). Acoustic probes were 50-ms, 95-dB
bursts of white noise with a nearly instan-
taneous rise time (generated through the noise
generator and ampliﬁer of the EMG startle
response system) and were delivered binaurally
through headphones at 1.5, 4.5 or 7.5 s follow-
ing picture onset. To minimize expectation,
startle probes were skipped from two trials per
valence per block, and three probes were given
within the inter-trial interval. A practice session
presenting nine neutral pictures and startle
probes was used in the beginning to habituate
participants to the startle probes.
EMG signals were ﬁltered (low cut-oﬀ:
0.5 Hz; high cut-oﬀ: 100 Hz) and rectiﬁed. Eye-
blink reﬂex magnitudes in mV were calculated by
subtracting the amount of integrated EMG
at reﬂex onset from the ﬁrst peak amplitude
of integrated EMG between 20 and 120 ms
following probe onset. Trials with no traceable
eye-blink reﬂex were assigned a magnitude of
zero and included in the analysis. Eye-blink re-
ﬂexes with an excessively noisy baseline (within
20 ms after the probe) were rejected. Four par-
ticipants (two from each group) were excluded
from the analysis because they displayed fewer
than 25% blink responses. Magnitude and
latency of the eye-blink reﬂex were recorded.
Subjective rating
After the recording, participants were asked to
review the pictures and rate the valence and
arousal levels of each picture on a 1–10 scale
(from negative to positive, low arousal to high
arousal).
Global executive functions
As global cognitive impairments (e.g. Austin
et al. 2001; Elliot et al. 1996) and over-general
autobiographical memory (for a recent review,
see Williams et al. 2004) were widely demon-
strated in depression, we included the following
tasks to examine whether neuroticism has an
eﬀect on memory, learning and problem solving.
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT )
The AVLT (Rey, 1964) was used to assess
learning and memory. In the immediate recall
phase, participants were read aloud a 15-item
word list and asked to recall as many words as
possible. This procedure was repeated ﬁve times.
A distracter list was then presented to create a
short delay, after which free recall of the ﬁrst list
was measured. Fifteen minutes later, partici-
pants were tested again with a free recall and
recognition test (15 target words plus 35 dis-
tracters).
Tower of London (TOL)
In this task two sets of three coloured balls were
presented on a touch-sensitive computer screen,
with each set being arranged like snooker balls
hanging in three pockets. Participants were
asked to rearrange the balls in one set to match
the other set under certain rules. The minimum
number of moves (2, 3, 4 or 5) required for each
trial was indicated. Participants were instructed
to work out the whole solution in mind before
making the ﬁrst move. In addition, two control
blocks were used to measure the time for actual
movement. In these, the balls were constantly
moved by the computer in one set and partici-
pants were asked to copy this movement on the
other set. Task performance was assessed by
three variables : number of problems solved with
minimum moves, average number of moves,
and thinking time. Thinking time was computed
by subtracting the reaction time of the control
trials from that of the main trials.
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT )
In the AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986),
participants were presented with 18 cue words
(nine positive and nine negative), each at a time,
and asked to recall a memory of a speciﬁc event
that the cue word reminded them of. Instruc-
tions deﬁned a speciﬁc event as any event that
took place on a particular day at a particular
place and no more recent than a week ago, and
that participants should not recall the same
event for more than one cue word. Each word
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was shown on a card and read aloud by the
experimenter. If a participant did not respond
after 30 s, the next word would be presented. A
practice trial with a neutral word (‘chicken’)
was used in the beginning to check that
the participant understood the instructions.
Latency (duration between the presentation of a
cue word and the start of the recall) and number
of speciﬁc responses were recorded.
Awakening salivary cortisol
At the end of the experiment, participants were
given instructions to collect ﬁve salivary samples
at home in the following morning: the ﬁrst
sample was taken immediately upon waking
(Time 1), and subsequent samples were taken at
15-min intervals for the next hour (Times 2, 3,
4 and 5 respectively). Participants were not
allowed to eat or drink during the test and not to
consume alcohol the night before. Nine subjects
(seven from H) failed to return their samples.
Cortisol was measured with an in-house double-
antibody radioimmunoassay. Cortisol levels
of the ﬁve samples (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5) were
entered into the following formula to compute
the area under the curve (Pruessner et al.
2003) : [(M2+M1)+(M3+M2)+(M4+M3)+
(M5+M4)]r15/2.
Statistics
Independent-samples t tests were used to reveal
group diﬀerences in psychological character-
istics, AVLT (delayed recognition), and TOL
(number of trials solved in minimum moves)
and salivary cortisol. Other data were analysed
by using two-way (facial expression recognition,
EPS, AMT, AVLT, TOL) or three-way
(emotional categorization, emotional memory,
dot probe) analyses of variance (ANOVAs),
with between-Ss variable as group (H, L) and
within-Ss variable(s) as emotion, trial and/or
task conditions. Individual ANOVAs and t tests
were run to clarify signiﬁcant interactions.
RESULTS
Psychological characteristics
Using the full EPQ scale, the two groups were
conﬁrmed to have signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
neuroticism scores (17.91¡2.84 v. 5.72¡3.27,
p<0.01). Although none of the volunteers had
ever met criteria for DSM-IV depression, and
mean scores on clinical symptom scales did not
exceed usual levels for remission, H participants
showed a signiﬁcantly higher level of depressive
mood, anxiety and hostility than L. They also
reported more rumination, dysfunctional atti-
tudes, parental over-protectiveness, and lower
social adaptation. By contrast, the two groups
did not diﬀer in family history of psychiatric
disorder, parental care, and stressful life experi-
ence (all p>0.10) (Table 1).
Emotional categorization
There was a signiﬁcant grouprtaskremotion
interaction [F(1, 63)=4.73, p=0.03] for reaction
time in the self-referent versus animal cate-
gorization tasks. Sensitivity analyses showed a
signiﬁcant groupremotion interaction in the
emotional categorization [Fig. 1(a) : F(1, 63)=
3.88, p=0.05] but not in the control task
[Fig. 1(b) : F(1, 63)=0.51, p=0.48]. H volunteers
were quicker at classifying negative versus posi-
tive personality characteristics than L. Further-
more, within the H group, the reaction time for
positive items was signiﬁcantly correlated with
N scores [r(33)=0.37, p=0.04], so reaction time
for positive items increased with neuroticism.
For accuracy data there was neither a group
diﬀerence [F(1, 63)=0.45, p=0.51] nor a group
Table 1. Psychological characteristics of the
two groups
Task High-N Low-N t p
HAMD 3.55 (3.33) 1.34 (2.36) 3.08 f0.00**
BDI 8.33 (5.97) 2.59 (2.67) 5.03 f0.00**
STAI State 37.82 (9.90) 27.56 (6.33) 4.99 f0.00**
STAI Trait 47.18 (11.84) 28.75 (5.19) 8.17 f0.00**
Bf-S 45.97 (28.43) 14.88 (13.96) 5.62 f0.00**
FNE 21.88 (6.13) 8.31 (4.73) 9.91 f0.00**
SASS 41.66 (5.47) 47.34 (4.09) x4.71 f0.00**
Hostility 32.00 (9.03) 24.13 (8.94) 3.51 f0.00**
Rumination 51.75 (8.95) 39.31 (8.51) 5.70 f0.00**
DAS
Overall 142.81 (20.93) 105.59 (21.12) 7.08 f0.00**
Perfectionism 46.91 (10.61) 33.22 (11.75) 4.89 f0.00**
Approval by
others
44.81 (8.54) 32.47 (8.20) 5.90 f0.00**
Stressful life
events
1.44 (1.24) 1.16 (1.55) 0.80 f0.43
N, Neuroticism; HAMD, Hamilton Depression Rating Scale ;
BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory; Bf-S, Beﬁndlichkeits Scale of Mood and Energy; FNE,
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale ; SASS, Social Adaptation Self-
evaluation Scale ; DAS, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale.
Values represent means (¡standard deviations).
Asterisks represent signiﬁcance of group comparisons : ** pf0.01.
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remotionrtask interaction [F(1, 63)=0.51,
p=0.48] but both groups achieved more than
90% accuracy in both categorization tasks,
implying a potential ceiling eﬀect.
Emotional memory
Recall
The two groups performed similarly in terms of
correct recall [Fig. 2(a) : group: F(1, 63)=0.47,
p=0.50; taskremotionrgroup: F(1, 63)=0.87,
p=0.35]. However, H volunteers produced
fewer positive memory intrusions than L
[Fig. 2(b) : groupremotion: F(1, 63)=7.54, p=
0.01] for self-referent information, but not in the
control task [groupremotion: F(1, 63)=0.01,
p=0.92].
Recognition
The two groups had similar accuracy (dk)
[group: F(1, 63)=0.07, p=0.79; taskremotionr
group: F(1, 63)=3.09, p=0.09] and response
bias (b) [group F(1, 63)=0.03, p=0.87; taskr
emotionrgroup F(1, 63)=0.50, p=0.48].
Facial expression recognition
There were no main eﬀects on accuracy, re-
action time or misclassiﬁcations in this task (all
p values>0.10). However, diﬀerences in recog-
nition of each emotion were further explored
using independent t tests, given a strong a
priori hypothesis for individual emotions. This
revealed a signiﬁcant group diﬀerence for accu-
racy of happy faces [Fig. 3: t(63)=2.05, p=0.04]
but not in any other emotions (all p values
>0.40). Speciﬁcally, H had a higher threshold
in identifying happy faces than did L; that is,
they needed higher intensity levels to be able to
correctly identify happy facial expressions.
Dot-probe task
There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the vigilance
scores of reaction time [group: F(1, 63)=0.22,
p=0.64; groupremotionrmask: F(1, 63)=0.03,
p=0.87] or accuracy [group: F(1, 63)=1.92, p=
0.17; groupremotionrmask: F(1, 63)=0.01,
p=0.95]. This was also true when only the un-
masked trials were considered: for reaction time
[group: F(1, 63)=0.10, p=0.76, emotionrgroup:
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F(1, 63)=0.01, p=0.94] and for accuracy
[group: F(1, 63)=0.49, p=0.49; emotionr
group: F(1, 63)=0.49, p=0.49] (see Table 2,
available online).
EPS
Eye-blink magnitude
The z-transformed data revealed the expected
potentiation eﬀect in both groups [Fig. 4(a) :
overall eﬀect of emotion: F(2, 118)=10.17,
p=0.001], with volunteers showing a greater
response to unpleasant than neutral or pleasant
pictures. However, this was not aﬀected by
neuroticism [group: F(1, 59)=0.86, p=0.40;
emotionrgroup: F(2, 118)=0.85, p=0.43].
Examination of raw startle amplitudes showed
a similar pattern [emotion: F(2, 118)=7.19,
p=0.001; group: F(1, 59)=1.33, p=0.25;
emotionrgroup: F(2, 118)=0.36, p=0.70]. The
average amplitudes were similar between H and
L [mean=1416.20 v. 1674.83; t(59)=x1.15,
p=0.25].
Eye-blink latency
There was a signiﬁcant groupremotion inter-
action [Fig. 4(b) : F(2, 116)=3.08, p=0.05], but
post-hoc comparisons failed to reveal group
diﬀerence within each emotional category (all
p>0.10). As shown by paired-samples t tests,
the interaction was mostly driven by H respon-
ding more slowly to pleasant than unpleasant
pictures [t(29)=2.04, p=0.05].
Subjective ratings
There was no group diﬀerence in terms of rating
for valence [group: F(1, 58)=0.12, p=0.73;
emotionrgroup: F(2, 116)=1.10, p=0.34] or
arousal [group: F(1, 58)=0.43, p=0.52; emo-
tionrgroup: F(2, 116)=1.14, p=0.32].
Non-emotional cognitive functions
In these tests, high-N subjects showed modest
trends to improved performance compared with
low-N (see Table 3, available online). In the
AVLT immediate recall there was a signiﬁcant
grouprtrial interaction [F(4, 253)=3.27, p=
0.01], with subsequent t tests suggesting that H
outperformed L only in the ﬁrst trial [t(63)=
2.21, p=0.03]. For the short- versus long-
delayed recalls there was no group diﬀerence
[F(1, 63)=0.02, p=0.89] or interaction [F(1, 63)
=1.77, p=0.19], nor was there any group
diﬀerence on long-delayed recognition [hits :
t(63)=x1.14, p=0.26; false alarms: t(63)=
1.26, p=0.21]. In the TOL there was a signiﬁ-
cant group eﬀect [F(1, 63)=5.75, p=0.02] and a
grouprtrial interaction [F(3, 189)=3.32, p=
0.02] in the number of moves required to solve
the problem. Subsequent t tests found that H
was better than L in the four-move problems
[t(63)=x2.29, p=0.03]. H also solved more
problems in a minimum number of moves than
did L [t(63)=2.16, p=0.03]. However, among H
volunteers, this measure was negatively corre-
lated with N score [r(33)=x0.35, p=0.05],
suggesting that the higher a participant scored
in neuroticism the fewer problems s/he managed
to solve in a minimum number of moves. There
were no eﬀects in terms of thinking times
[group: F(1, 63)=0.55, p=0.46; interaction:
F(3, 189)=0.48, p=0.70]. When the perfection-
ism score from the DAS was included as a
covariate in these analyses, the diﬀerences were
lost [AVLT Immediate Recall grouprtrial :
F(4, 244)=1.33, p=0.26; TOL Number of
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FIG. 4. (a) Amplitude of startle response (Z scores) and (b) average
latency of startle response while viewing the three types of pictures.
Values represent means¡standard error of the mean. Asterisks
represent statistical signiﬁcance of comparisons between startle
responses during pleasant and unpleasant pictures within each group
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Moves group eﬀect : F(1, 61)=3.08, p=0.08;
grouprtrial F(3, 183)=2.21, p=0.09].
In the AMT, there were no eﬀects on la-
tency [group: F(1, 63)=0.01, p=0.95; groupr
emotion: F(1, 63)=0.65, p=0.42] or number of
speciﬁc memories produced [group: F(1, 63)=
2.20, p=0.14; interaction: F(1, 63)=0.65, p=
0.42] (see Table 3, available online).
Awakening salivary cortisol
The mean time of awakening did not diﬀer
between H and L participants (0838 v. 0813 h).
The area under the curve of cortisol responses
revealed no group diﬀerence (1375.80¡552.23
v. 1568.22¡593.85, p=0.23) (see Fig. 5, avail-
able online).
DISCUSSION
Our results show that biases in information
processing are present in high-N students who
are at risk of depression but have not been
depressed. Decreased positive or increased
negative processing was seen across a number of
tasks including emotional categorization and
memory, facial expression recognition and EPS,
in the absence of global memory or executive
deﬁcits. However, there was no evidence for
eﬀects of neuroticism on attentional bias (meas-
ured with the dot-probe task), over-general
autobiographical memory, or elevated morning
cortisol levels.
As noted in the introduction, it has often been
suggested that negative biases may be a trait
vulnerability marker for depression. However,
by eliminating subjects with previous depres-
sion, our results establish a direct association
between cognitive abnormality and vulner-
ability to depression without the contamination
of a scar eﬀect.
Although the relationship between neuro-
ticism and cognitive processing has been re-
searched for decades (e.g. Lishman, 1974; Lloyd
& Lishman, 1975; Martin et al. 1983), these
studies were mostly performed on non-selective
samples with which correlations were examined
between N and response (e.g. speed of memory
recall). In contrast to this approach, our study
selected participants from the extreme range of
N (high versus low) and thus directly illustrated
the inﬂuence of high neuroticism on emotional
processing.
In the emotional categorization and memory
tasks, H volunteers were faster to classify dis-
likeable self-referent personality characteristics
and produced fewer positive memory intrusions.
This bias away from the positive was similarly
revealed in the perception of social information,
as measured by the facial expression recognition
task. H volunteers had a higher threshold for
identifying happy faces than the control volun-
teers. A reduction in positive facial perception
echoes previous experimental ﬁndings in de-
pressed patients (Murphy et al. 1999; Suslow
et al. 2001) and healthy volunteers undergoing a
negative mood induction (Bouhuys et al. 1995).
By contrast, recovered patients also tend to
show an increased perception of negative ex-
pression such as fear, disgust and sadness
(Bouhuys et al. 1999; Bhagwagar et al. 2004;
Hayward et al. 2005). This suggests the hy-
pothesis that risk for depression is largely
manifest as reduced positive processing of
emotional information, which is accompanied
by increased negative processing only after the
actual experience of depression.
EPS was used to give a physiological measure
of reactivity to emotional information. Our
sample, regardless of group membership, ex-
hibited the expected EPS pattern with enhanced
eye-blink during the presentation of aversive
pictures relative to neutral or pleasant pictures,
which is widely demonstrated in laboratory
work (e.g. Bradley et al. 1990; Cook et al. 1991).
The two groups gave similar pleasantness
ratings for the pictures. Unexpectedly, while
amplitude was unaﬀected, there was an eﬀect
of neuroticism on blink latency. H volunteers
showed a signiﬁcant delay in their reﬂexive re-
sponse to pleasant pictures. A reduced physio-
logical reactivity to positive stimuli in the
absence of diﬀerential subjective rating implies
that neuroticism involves biases in mechanisms
that are highly automatic and thus not inﬂu-
enced by self-report. The current result is com-
patible with the theory that low activity in
appetitive emotional systems is the core deﬁcit
in depression (Fowles, 1988; Depue & Iacono,
1989; Clark & Watson, 1991), although latency
variables are infrequently reported for the
EPS task.
The negative ﬁndings in this study may
indicate domains in which deﬁcits are simply
not associated with depression vulnerability or,
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instead, may arise solely from the experience of
depression. Thus, the dot-probe task provides
evidence that attentional biases play no role in
neuroticism and, as noted in the introduction,
attentional biases have never been reliably
shown in depression either. By contrast, the
negative results in autobiographical memory are
notable because an over-general memory deﬁcit
has been robustly found across clinical samples.
Among the few that examined over-general
memory before depression (e.g. Mackinger
et al. 2000a, b ; von Minnen et al. 2005), the
results were confounded to some extent by prior
trauma experiences and/or unclear history of
depression. A recent study (Gibbs & Rude,
2004) found that over-general memory interacts
with stressful life events in predicting sub-
sequent depression symptoms in randomly
selected students, but the experience of de-
pression was not deﬁned. We propose that over-
general memory does not contribute to the
vulnerability to depression shown by high-N
subjects.
Our negative ﬁndings for awakening cortisol
in high-N students contrast with the hyper-
activity of the HPA axis reported previously in a
substantially older sample (Portella et al. 2005)
and in an older subgroup of high-N subjects
(Zobel et al. 2004). Our data are comparable
with those obtained in the high-N subjects of a
similar age range (Zobel et al. 2004). Therefore,
it is possible that dysfunction of the HPA
axis occurs with increasing age in vulnerable
individuals, possibly as an interaction between
risk and exposure to toxic life events. Alterna-
tively, it cannot be ruled out from our data set
that elevated cortisol responses may only be
seen in a subpopulation of high neurotic sub-
jects who will eventually develop depression.
Longitudinal studies are required to test this
hypothesis.
As anticipated, results from AVLT and TOL
revealed no global cognitive impairment by
neuroticism. These are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that cognitive deﬁcits are largely con-
ﬁned to periods of illness in depression rather
than as a more general trait (Peselow et al. 1991;
Austin et al. 2001). There was a tendency for H
volunteers to perform better in these tasks,
which appeared to be related to their enhanced
drive or perfectionism. This enhanced cognitive
function makes the speciﬁc reduction in positive
processing also found in this group more note-
worthy.
The current study has a number of limi-
tations. Although high neuroticism is a robust
risk factor for depression, the relatively low
prevalence rates of depression imply that only a
small proportion of the high-N population will
go on to develop depression, thereby potentially
diluting any eﬀects that we may have seen. While
this could account for the lack of eﬀect in terms
of cortisol responses and autobiographical
memory performance, it could not account for
the negative biases that were seen in the group as
a whole. Longitudinal studies are required to
assess the predictive power of negative biases for
subsequent depression in a sample adequately
powered for the detection of infrequent events.
Finally, in the current study the experimenters
were not blind to group membership. Although
this is unlikely to have an inﬂuence on the
results because responses were collected auto-
matically by computer and task instructions
were standardized across participants, future
studies may want to assess negative bias using a
blinded design to conﬁrm these ﬁndings.
Conclusion
There has been an ongoing controversy whether
biased cognition is a state or trait marker for
depression. Negative cognitive biases in healthy
volunteers after a depressive mood induction
give partial support for the ‘state hypothesis ’
(Mathews & Bradley, 1983; Sutton et al. 1988).
However, neuroticism in individuals without
a history of depression was associated with
reduced positive processing in our study, thus
strongly suggesting that cognitive biases rep-
resent a trait vulnerability marker for de-
pression. Furthermore, the processes that were
found to be aﬀected by neuroticism overlap with
the processes that are aﬀected by antidepressant
drug treatment in healthy volunteers (Harmer
et al. 2003, 2004). This overlap validates the
earlier suggestion that antidepressants act on the
key cognitive components of emotional proces-
sing related to the acquisition and maintenance
of mood disorders. In the future, longitudinal
studies are required to investigate whether, and
to what extent, such cognitive vulnerability
predicts subsequent depression. If so, this could
pave the way for further studies evaluating
the eﬃcacy of early interventions targeting the
Neuroticism and negative bias 1289
dysfunctional cognitive styles of the high-risk
population.
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